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intrODuCtiOn
The Cities and Fragile States programme contributes to 
understandings of state fragility through a focus on the local, 
urban scale. States do not just exist at the national level and cities 
are important sites of intensive state concentration. Along with 
being potential incubators of democratic innovation and economic 
growth, they are and have always been intrinsically linked to the 
processes of bureaucratisation and state-building. As the work of 
Charles Tilly (1992) showed, it was the negotiated relationships 
between sovereigns seeking to fight wars, and urban capitalists 
with the means to fund them, that resulted in consolidated national 
states in Europe. Cities and war, then, interacted to make states. 
Our research shows the intersection of cities, states and war to be 
far more complex in the contemporary developing world. Cities 
have changed, states have changed, and armed conflict itself has 
changed. Nevertheless, getting to grips with contemporary state 
fragility in a rapidly urbanising developing world still requires an 
understanding of the way cities are related to contemporary violent 
conflicts. While urban areas are still often at the forefront of state-
making, paradoxically they are increasingly also primary sites of 
state erosion and crisis across much of the developing world – a 
fact that is often obscured by the concentration of both wealth 
and state organisation in cities. Understanding this dual character 
of cities in relation to conflict and fragility is an essential part of 
any holistic approach to state-building. 
Many cities in contemporary fragile states emerged as sites of 
colonial extraction, and urban elites and middle classes never 
possessed the autonomy from states that gave bargaining power 
to their equivalents in the European historical experience. Moreover, 
those holding state power in developing countries now often tend 
to access capital regionally or from abroad rather than domestically, 
and urban and rural fortunes are frequently interdependent. 
Consequently, while there have been many violent conflicts in post-
colonial states since independence, they have not been routinely 
forged on the back of resources provided by urban capitalist elites. 
Furthermore, although the number of wars – both inter-state 
and civil – has clearly been declining during the second half of 
the twentieth century (Newman 2009), other forms of conflict 
are proliferating. These are mainly centred around cities and civic 
discontent and represent the biggest contemporary threat to 
human security worldwide. 
three FOrms OF COnFliCt
Violence itself is often categorised as being political, social or 
economic in nature. In this project, however, we adopt a view 
that all violent conflict is intrinsically political, even where there 
is no attempt to take control of the state itself. We frame our 
discussion in relation to the three concepts of antagonism, conflict 
hiGhliGhts: 
•  Sovereign and civil wars are declining, but civic conflicts – 
encompassing various forms of violence in cities – are on 
the rise.
•  Cities are often havens of relative security in civil war; but 
it would be a mistake to take urban security for granted 
when war has ended. Major population movements and 
socio-economic ruptures often lead to widespread conflict 
in cities after civil war.
•  Due attention needs to be paid to the often-overlooked 
effects of sovereign and civil conflict – and post conflict 
reconstruction – on the local, as well as national state; 
often municipal state capacities are eroded with long-term 
implications for development.
•  Fragile states will continue to rapidly urbanise, and unless 
issues such as urban employment, housing and basic 
services are addressed, civic conflict is likely.
•  Social relations in cities are always antagonistic, but the 
question is how to translate this into generative civic 
engagement rather than violent civic conflict. Simply 
suppressing conflict can be counterproductive in the 
medium and long term. 
•  Cities are privileged arenas in which to push the 
boundaries of confrontational democratic politics. ‘Do 
no harm’ to the urban middle classes in development 
interventions, but also find meaningful ways to extend the 
political process to be more inclusive of the popular classes.
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2and engagement. Antagonisms are part and parcel of social order; 
inevitable aspects of development and change (Beall 2009). The 
important question is whether these are channelled destructively 
through conflict (which in the remainder of the paper can be taken 
to mean violent conflict) or in a more constructive way through 
generative forms of engagement. Conflict still characterises the 
majority of fragile states in one way or another; indeed it is arguably 
the most important indicator of their fragility. Our typology of 
conflict goes beyond the simple inter-state/civil war distinction 
while also eschewing the idea of distinguishing political and 
non-political forms. Instead we have categorised according to 
issues of space and scale, questions of sovereignty and patterns 
of organisation, with a particular focus on the role of cities. 
Sovereign conflict refers to situations where international actors 
are directly and explicitly involved in warfare. Despite its decline, its 
destructiveness in both the long and short term can be immense, 
as Iraq and Afghanistan amply testify. Cities, and capital cities in 
particular, are seen as significant territory in sovereign conflicts; 
securing the city is an overriding priority, which also means that 
forms of insurgency are increasingly concentrated in cities, as 
those seeking to resist invading powers turn to asymmetric forms 
of warfare such as urban terrorism to maximise casualties on the 
invading side. In processes of reconstruction after sovereign wars, 
international actors also pour into cities, which can concentrate 
decision-making about the needs of urban-dwellers in the hands 
of international and national actors rather than local ones. As the 
cases of Kabul in Afghanistan (Esser 2009) and Dili in East Timor 
(Moxham 2008) illustrate, this kind of international involvement 
can have negative consequences for the city and ultimately lead 
to further outbreaks of conflict, both locally and more broadly. 
Civil conflict refers to violent conflict between two or more 
organised groups within sovereign boundaries (though there may 
be outside intervention), one or more of which represents (or claims 
to represent) part of the state itself, who are fighting for control of 
some part of state institutions and/or territory. Historically this has 
often taken root in rural areas where rebel military organisation 
can more easily evade state reach, meaning that even though 
cities are often the ‘prize’ to be won as confirmation of victory 
(Landau-Wells 2008) they often remain spaces of relative security 
even as rural refugees flock in to escape the conflict. This was 
evident in the civil wars of Northern Uganda (Branch 2008), 
Nicaragua (Rodgers 2008), Kashmir (Venkatachalam 2007) and 
the South Bolivar region of Colombia (Vargas 2009). It was also 
true of several of Afghanistan’s cities during the 1980s, even while 
civil war raged outside (Giustozzi 2009), and remains true to a 
certain extent of Quetta in the violent ‘AfPak’ border zone today 
(Gazdar et al 2010). The last two examples also demonstrate 
cities’ key role in war economies, which often provides motivation 
to keep them secure. Under these circumstances cities can become 
relatively autonomous, turning away from what is left of the state 
and seeking protection instead from rebel groups, as the case of 
Goma, Eastern DRC testifies (Vlassenroot & Buescher 2009). 
Civic conflict refers to a broad array of conflicts, all of which 
tend to take place in cities. These include gang warfare, violent 
crime, terrorism, religious and sectarian riots, and spontaneous 
riots or violent protest over perceived state failures. These may spill 
beyond city boundaries but are associated with one or more of 
the distinctly urban qualities of density, heterogeneity, compressed 
inequality, and the location of government. Civil conflict can span 
urban as well as rural areas, but differs in that it is an instrumental 
endeavour to take control of the state or supplant some of 
its functions; civic conflict, by contrast is ultimately a reactive 
expression of grievances vis-à-vis the state or other urban actors. 
It is not the fact that cities are inherently alienating spaces that 
leads to civic conflict, but the way in which power is structured in 
spaces with dense concentrations of people (Rodgers 2010). For 
example our study of Ahmedabad, Western India (Chandhoke 
2009) demonstrates how the civic riots of 2002 were not just an 
expression of conflict between two social groups, but were clearly 
linked to the fact that Hindu ethno-religious identity had become 
connected to a particular, exclusive state-making project in the 
state of Gujurat, as became starkly manifest in its capital city. 
Thus while cities are certainly always antagonistic, whether this 
results in violent conflict is fundamentally a question of politics, 
exercised at different levels but impacting on cities. 
COnFliCt transitiOns
Civic conflict is undoubtedly on the rise, probably in absolute terms 
and certainly in relative terms. This is linked to trends in other forms 
of conflict: for example, civil wars – which have tended to drive 
urbanisation – are on the decline, and in their wake variants of civic 
conflict are increasingly emerging as responses to that urbanisation 
(see Box 1). Understanding this may help us make sense of the 
fact that cities have been islands of stability and security in many 
conflicts, yet are also associated with some of the bloodiest violence 
of the contemporary era. Certainly, each year around three times 
more people die as a result of ‘interpersonal violence’ (a category 
corresponding fairly closely to civic conflict) than inter-state or civil 
war; and the figure is rising (Fox and Hoelscher 2010).
BOx 1: the shiFt FrOm 
Civil tO CiviC COnFliCts 
In 2006, the streets of Dili, the capital of East Timor, exploded 
into civic conflict some years after the end of the civil conflict 
that brought its independence, and despite the massive 
presence of UN peacekeepers. This was arguably because 
the ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction process failed to take into 
account the effects of rapid urbanisation during and after 
the war, as our work has shown (Moxham 2008). Similar 
concerns are raised in our research on Northern Uganda, 
which suggests that ‘if Gulu town is to become destabilised 
internally or if its population is to become a destablising 
influence in the region, this would only occur, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, after the war ends’ (Branch 2009: 2). More 
generally, CSRC work shows that the impacts of economic 
sanctions, unbalanced peace processes and heavily politicised 
policing in the wake of civil wars can heighten the potential 
for civic conflict to erupt in the ‘post-conflict’ moment 
(Keen 2009; Davis 2007). 
‘ Both inter-state war and civil war are in 
decline. Yet few would argue that the world 
is becoming a safer place. How can we make 
sense of this paradox?’
3‘ Cities are critical to our understanding of the 
dynamics of contemporary violent conflict and 
processes of state fragility, and offer key policy 
entry points for strengthening fragile states.’
Global trends in conflict therefore seem to point inescapably towards 
urban manifestations. Even where civil conflicts do still emerge, or 
spiral out of and into civic ones, they are likely to be increasingly 
urban in character as the contemporary examples of Iraq and 
Afghanistan testify. In countries that have previously experienced 
major civil war and are averse to the idea of another prolonged, 
rural insurgency, the expression of grievances is likely to manifest on 
city streets. As a Ugandan politician noted in relation to recent riots 
in Kampala, people ‘don’t want a war but they want something 
else they are unable to explain’; something that starts ‘from the 
city’ (Goodfellow, n.d.).
CiviC COnFliCt anD the 
urBan pOlitiCal prOCess
In the context of this relative rise in civic conflict, how urban 
antagonisms are manipulated, channelled, deferred or suppressed 
has important impacts on both the incidence of violent conflict 
and prospects for long-term development. A CSRC case study 
of Colombian cities illustrates how particular urban political 
configurations can bring radical reductions in civic conflict in 
some contexts but not others (Guttierez et al 2009). Institutional 
changes that provided new spaces for political debate in Bogotá 
and Medellín allowed for a coalition of the elite and urban middle 
class to form, in turn leading to recognition of their shared interests 
in an improved security environment and the decision to support 
substantial increases in public goods provision. The policies of 
this coalition ultimately led to dramatic reductions in homicides 
in what had been two of the most dangerous cities in the world 
until the mid-1990s.
The key point about the transformation of these cities is that at 
a critical juncture a balance of power emerged that incentivised 
action to reduce civic conflict rather than generate it. Without the 
institutionalised forms of civic engagement that allowed this to 
happen, factional politics prevail and diverse social groups cannot 
easily come together in a developmental coalition. This was the 
case for example in Ahmedabad in Western India, which our 
research shows to be historically weak in terms of civil society, trade 
unionism and cross-ethnic political exchange, and therefore prone 
to the manipulation of urban antagonisms into violent conflict by 
political organisations that draw their support from division rather 
than from agendas for change through engagement. 
The Colombian case demonstrates the crucial importance of 
flexible mechanisms for dynamic engagement that allow a wider 
range of actors than previously to come together, recognising new 
configurations of shared interests and producing developmental 
outcomes. While the elite-middle class coalition that emerged in 
Bogotá and Medellín was actually rather exclusive of the urban 
poor, it still benefited them. However, this may not be the case 
everywhere. Indeed, to avert civic conflict in other settings may 
require extending such processes beyond the middle class. Events 
in Bangkok clearly illustrate this, insofar as it was the exclusion 
of the poor from a pact between the monarchist elite and the 
urban middle class (Glassman 2010) that led to the protest that 
spiralled into civic conflict in May 2010. The experience of the 
Colombian cities may therefore not be easily replicable; without 
the high homicide rates that threatened all classes in those cities, a 
developmental elite-middle class coalition may not have emerged. 
In Managua for example, the middle class and elite have managed 
to spatially isolate themselves from crime, and this has prevented 
the emergence of pro-poor solutions (Rodgers 2007). 
the pOtential DanGers 
OF DeFerreD anD 
suppresseD COnFliCt
Where civil conflict has created ‘conflict fatigue’ among the 
population, post-war governments often benefit from broad 
support and a general aversion to politics. Under such circumstances, 
societal antagonisms can be ‘deferred’ or actively suppressed for 
a period of time. However, when governments begin to fail on 
some of their promises, the combination of frustrated expectations 
and unexpressed grievances can explode into civic conflict, as 
recent fatal riots in Maputo illustrate (Sumich 2010). The case 
of Rwanda, where political debate is tightly circumscribed, poses 
similar if not more severe dangers given its history. While the 
suppression of competitive politics was widely considered to be 
necessary for a period after the genocide, the spate of grenade 
attacks in Kigali in the first half of 2010 raises serious questions 
about where continued suppression could lead. 
Cities are pivotal sites of middle class growth and consolidation 
vis-à-vis the state – vital processes in development (Birdsall 2007) 
but also antagonistic ones – and they are also spaces where the 
presence or absence of the state features prominently in the daily 
lives of all citizens. As such they should be places where antagonism 
is channelled into politics and the boundaries of political debate 
and participation are pushed. In cases such as Kigali this should 
certainly be done gradually and tentatively; but even in these 
circumstances cities should be thought of as incubators of the 
political aspects of development as well as engines of economic 
growth. Fostering urban political processes with an emphasis 
on drawing out civic demands in relation to issues of housing, 
service delivery and employment relations offers the potential to 
nurture political identities that will redraw the lines of antagonism 
away from issues of ethnicity, race and religion, which rarely lead 
to generative outcomes, notwithstanding the importance of 
addressing horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2002). 
Cities, states  
anD COnFliCt 
We consider state fragility to be impacted on by three key processes 
of state erosion, consolidation and transformation. The latter two 
processes can be thought of as linked to resilience and development 
respectively. Civil and sovereign conflicts are not only major 
setbacks to state-building at the national level, they can also 
erode state capacity at the city level. For example they can render 
those ‘secure’ cities that are struggling to cope with surrounding 
conflict more dependent on financial transfers from the centre, 
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at the expense of developing their own taxation mechanisms 
(Venkatachalam 2007), or they can result in international actors 
intervening to ‘over-determine’ urban decision-making ‘above 
the heads’ of local state institutions (Esser 2009). Civic conflicts 
impact on state erosion particularly at the local level, with our case 
studies of Ahmedabad (Chandhoke 2009) and Karachi (Budhani 
et al 2010) demonstrating how non-state violence can be seen as 
increasingly legitimate, ultimately undermining local state authority 
and consolidation. 
There are different ways of managing the antagonisms that 
accompany the inevitable process of urbanisation, with each having 
different implications for state consolidation and transformation. We 
juxtapose two broad ways in which these antagonisms are often 
managed – manipulation into conflict and deferral/suppression 
– with a normatively preferable and occasionally evident third: 
generative engagement. The first, manipulation into conflict, leads 
to violent civic outcomes and state erosion, as noted above. The 
second, which might take the form of active suppression or more 
consensual ‘deferral’, sometimes arises when the exhaustion due 
to experience of a previous civil war allows governments more 
leeway than usual. Although this may stave off violent conflict 
for a certain period, there is a danger under these conditions that 
the state might undergo some transformation through ambitious 
agendas for change but may not adequately consolidate, creating 
new tensions that derive from long-standing grievances. Eventually 
these cannot be contained, resulting in civic violence. 
To minimise violent civic conflict in both the long and short term 
while also allowing for states to both consolidate and transform, 
there is an urgent need for institutionalised forms of political 
organisation and interaction that structure the interests of socio-
economic groups vis-à-vis states, forcing political solutions to emerge 
out of debate and institutionalised bargaining. The cases of Bogotá 
and Medellín, and also Durban (Beall and Ngonyama 2009), 
illustrate the possibility cities offer for developmental coalition-
formation in the face of conflict, despite their limitations. These 
institutional bargaining processes place new demands on the 
state and therefore create a need for strong and active states that 
are capable of responding accordingly. Thus in an ideal scenario 
state-making, socio-economic bargains and the reduction of civic 
conflict are all mutually supportive processes. To achieve this we 
propose that the real challenge is changing the logic of politics 
from one which is either about violent conflict or relatively inclusive 
but unproductive and informal rent-sharing, to one which treads a 
difficult middle path: essentially a reinvigoration of creative political 
contestation, which is most likely to emerge in cities.
In cities in fragile states, populations ultimately do not demand 
enough of the state. This is because the mechanisms are not in place 
for them to do so, stunted civil societies have not generated a culture 
of rights, and demands instead are focused on individual patrons. 
Ultimately, states can only achieve developmental transformation if 
their citizens are given and claim the institutional space to engage 
and make demands on the state itself: and it is those most proximal 
to the state – urban dwellers – who have the greatest prospects of 
forming the necessary coalitions to allow this to happen.
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